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SHOOTING BLANKS: THE INEFFECTIVENESS OF THE 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH’S ENTRANCE INTO THE GREAT 
PATENT TROLL HUNT 
Daniel A. Tagliente* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Many regard the American patent system as a great institution that 
provides incredible value to the United States economy.1  This notion 
is not universal, however, and some believe that the patent system does 
not provide value or should be abolished altogether.2  Despite those 
who discount its value, the American patent system has many benefits.  
Patent-intensive industries provide over 7,000,000 jobs3 and, along with 
other intellectual property fields, account for up to 34.8 percent of the 
country’s gross domestic product (GDP).4  Many patent-intensive 
industries are made up of large corporations with extensive patent 
portfolios, which are used to generate profit from licensing fees as well 
as to protect against infringers.5  Although the patent system is 
fundamentally important to many of these large corporations that may 
have hundreds or thousands of patents issued each year,6 the patent 
system can be just as valuable to individual inventors and small 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, Seton Hall University School of Law; M.S., 2010, Lehigh 
University; B.S., 2009, Lehigh University. 
 1  See Congressman Lamar Smith, Protecting Americas Ideas, HOUSE.GOV (Apr. 20, 
2007), http://lamarsmith.house.gov/media-center/columns/protecting-americas-
ideas (“Strengthening intellectual property leads to economic growth, job creation 
and the type of creativity that has made America the envy of the world.”).  See also ECON. 
AND STATISTICS ADMIN. & U. S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: INDUSTRIES IN FOCUS (Mar. 2012), available at http://www. 
uspto.gov/news/publications/IP_Report_March_2012.pdf (explaining the estimated 
financial impacts of intellectual property on the U.S. economy). 
 2  See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 899 (2002). 
 3  ECON. AND STATISTICS ADMIN. & U. S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 
1.  
 4  ECON. AND STATISTICS ADMIN. & U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 
1 at vii. 
 5  See Patrick Thomas & Anthony Breitzman, Patent Power 2012, IEEE SPECTRUM 
(Dec. 3, 2012, 17:11 GMT), available at http://spectrum.ieee.org/ns/pdfs/2012 
Patentscorecard2a.pdf (depicting the patent power scorecard).  
 6  Id. 
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businesses trying to protect the rights associated with their innovation 
and ingenuity. 
For some small businesses and individual inventors, the patent 
system embodies the “American Dream” because of the way in which it 
rewards the individual who comes up with an innovative idea and 
succeeds in reducing it to practice through his or her own intellectual 
efforts, hard work, and determination.7  The patent system operates in 
a quid pro quo nature, granting an inventor the right to exclude 
“others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention”8 
in exchange for a fully-enabling disclosure of how the invention can 
be made or used.9 
Over the course of the last several years, much of the intellectual 
property community has realized that the patent system is not perfect.  
Some have suggested that the patent system must evolve in order to 
keep up with the ever-changing nature of technology and of the global 
market.10  There have been several recent attempts to institutionalize 
this evolution of the patent system.  For instance, regulatory aspects of 
the patent system have been consistently strengthened since 2000, 
causing the patent system as a whole to move away from several of the 
traditional principles upon which it has previously relied, and instead, 
to be subject to stricter governmental controls.11  Although these 
controls may intend to create a more efficient environment, they may 
actually restrict the free market and hinder innovation.12 
 
 
 
 
 7  See Campbell Chiang, A Putative Inventor’s Remedies to Correct Inventorship on A 
Patent, 2 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 20 (2003). 
 8  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006). 
 9  See JOHN SCHLICHER, PATENT LAW: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES § 13:5 (2d 
ed. 2003) (discussing the quid pro quo nature of the patent system). 
 10  See Manny Schecter, The Emerging Global Market for Intellectual Property, FORBES 
(Apr. 18, 2012, 12:47 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2012/04/18/ 
the-emerging-global-market-for-intellectual-property (“IP systems must continue to 
evolve to help foster a robust market.”).  See also Colleen V. Chien, Turn the Tables on 
Patent Trolls, FORBES (Aug. 9, 2011, 11:37 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
ciocentral/2011/08/09/turn-the-tables-on-patent-trolls. (“Of course, from a societal 
perspective, patent law needs to evolve to meet the changing needs of modern society.  
That means finding a balance between adequately protecting innovation while 
reducing the payday for those pursuing litigation over patents held on small advances 
in complex technologies.”). 
 11  See Mark A. Lemley, The Regulatory Turn in IP, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 109, 
110 (2013) (discussing the change of the patent system from an institution guided by 
common law principles to one guided by regulatory principles). 
 12  Id. 
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Of the numerous developing issues within the intellectual 
property community, one of the more recent and pervasive concerns 
has been both the impact of, and the question of how to address, the 
“non-practicing entity” (NPE) and the “patent assertion entity” (PAE) 
within the context of the overall patent system.  Although these groups 
have been recognized since at least the early 1990s,13 they have received 
much greater attention in recent years.  The actual terms “non-
practicing entity” and “patent assertion entity” are neutral 
descriptions,14 but NPEs and PAEs are also commonly referred to by 
the pejorative term “patent trolls.”15  Rather than residing in solitude 
throughout remote mountain communities,16 these types of trolls often 
seek refuge under the shelter of a “shell” company and are armed with 
an arsenal of issued, but non-practiced, patents.  Patent trolls—and the 
closely related group of “patent privateers”17—are often criticized for 
misusing and manipulating the patent system in a way that limits, 
impedes, and generally hurts both trade and innovation by leveraging 
patents without advancing science or technology.18  These criticisms 
are based on the fact that “patent trolls” often do not produce or sell 
actual products or inventions and are therefore “non-practicing.”  
Instead of simply protecting their legal rights, these entities are often 
viewed as extortionists who choose to assert a patent solely in order to 
sue others, rather than practicing the invention on the open market.19  
 
 13  See Brenda Sandburg, Battling the Patent Trolls, THE RECORDER, July 30, 2001 
(discussing how the first known public use of the term “patent troll” was in 1993 by 
Peter Detkin, former general counsel at Intel, who created the term as a result of being 
sued for libel after describing a group as “patent extortionists”). 
 14  See Brief for Time Warner Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae supporting Petitioners, 
eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No. 05-130), 2006 WL 
235010, at *5. 
 15  Lamina Packing Innovations, LLC v. Monsieur Touton Selection, Ltd., 12 CIV. 
5039 CM, 2013 WL 1421781, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2013). 
 16  The origin of trolls can be traced back to Scandinavian folklore, in which they 
were depicted as unfriendly, hermit-like, powerful, and dumb beings that often ran 
into conflict with humans, although they prefered to live an isolationist lifestyle, 
seeking refuge in mountains and caves. 
 17  Many consider “patent Privateers” to be a variant of a typical patent assertion 
entity.  These entities are authorized by a patent owner or are sold patent rights with 
the intention of attacking another company, usually a competitor of the original 
patent holder.  See Thomas L. Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights by 
Corporations and Investors: IP Privateering & Modern Letters of Marque & Reprisal, 4 
HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 5 (2012).   
 18  Jeremiah Chan & Matthew Fawcett, Footsteps of the Patent Troll, 10 INTELL. PROP. 
L. BULL. 1, 7 (2005). 
 19  See eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (stating that some “firms use patents not as a basis for producing and 
selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees”). 
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The matter is complicated, however, by the fact that a patent holder 
who does not practice his invention is still fully within his rights to file 
a lawsuit if his patent has been infringed.20 
Often, the primary goal of NPEs and PAEs is to produce a revenue 
stream by forcing companies that sell products which may be similar 
to the claimed invention to surrender licensing fees.21  With the costs 
of defending allegations of improper patent use reaching up to $5 
million,22 most defendants, particularly small and mid-sized businesses 
or individuals, would rather reach a settlement or licensing agreement 
than litigate.23  Many consider this strategy of suing an alleged 
infringer—particularly a small entity that lacks the financial resources 
necessary to put on a defense—and forcing it into a settlement 
agreement to be an abusive practice.24  Even when a defendant does 
not quickly seek a settlement, and a patent troll’s lawsuit goes to court, 
the patent troll receives a significant procedural advantage because the 
United States Code tends to favor the patentee, as demonstrated by the 
fact that patent holders receive a presumption of validity for their 
patents—an assumption that the defendant must then refute.25  This 
business model results in a flourishing patent troll industry.26 
Identifying a “patent troll” is not always an easy task since there is 
no official legal definition for the term, and parties disagree as to the 
term’s true definition.27  Courts have tried to define the term, and 
although definitions may vary, many accept that the term “patent troll” 
usually refers to an entity “who enforces patent rights against accused 
infringers in an attempt to collect licensing fees, but does not 
 
 20  See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006). 
 21  See eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (stating that some “firms use patents not as a basis for producing and 
selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees”). 
 22  Jim Kerstetter, How Much Is That Patent Lawsuit Going to Cost You?, CNET NEWS 
(Apr. 5, 2012, 10:00 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-32973_3-57409792-296/how-
much-is-that-patent-lawsuit-going-to-cost-you/. 
 23  Id. 
 24  See, e.g., John Malcolm & Andrew Kloster, A Balanced Approach to Patent Reform: 
Addressing the Patent-Troll Problem Without Stifling Innovation, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 
9, 2014), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/01/a-balanced-approach-
to-patent-reform-addressing-the-patent-troll-problem-without-stifling-innovation 
(comparing actions filed by patent trolls to other “nuisance” lawsuits in which the 
primary goal of initiating litigation is to extract a settlement). 
 25  See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006). 
 26  See Charles E. Schumer, A Strategy for Combating Patent Trolls, WALL ST. J. (June 
12, 2013, 6:59 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323844 
804578531021238656366. 
 27  See Mark A. Lemley, Missing the Forest for Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2125 
n.41 (2013). 
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manufacture products or supply services based on the patents in 
question.”28  The term has also developed a pejorative connotation 
through its use within the intellectual property community, although 
it has sometimes also been adopted—or even embraced—by those 
whom the term is meant to describe.29 
The intellectual property community has an ongoing debate as to 
whether “patent trolls” pose a legitimate threat to the patent system 
and to the economy.30  While there are some who believe that patent 
trolls are nonthreatening or actually benefit the economy,31 other 
analysts estimate that patent troll activity may cost the American 
economy approximately $29 billion32—or, in some other estimates, up 
to $80 billion33—in lost growth each year.  Based on this information 
and the way in which patent trolls often intend to extract settlements 
and licensing fees from sometimes innocent parties,34 this Comment 
operates under the presumption that patent trolls do pose a legitimate 
threat to innovation and to the economy, and that their abusive 
litigation tactics should be eliminated in order to protect and benefit 
the United States patent system. 
Courts have also acknowledged the difficulty involved in defining 
what exactly makes an entity a “patent troll”—a complex 
determination that is compounded by the fact that there is significant 
disagreement as to whether or not patent trolls pose a real problem.35  
Despite this uncertainty, however, some of these same courts have 
 
 28  Internet Ad Sys., LLC v. Opodo, Ltd., 481 F. Supp. 2d 596, 601 (N.D. Tex. 2007). 
 29  See J.P. Mello, Legal Update, Technology Licensing and Patent Trolls, 12 B.U. J. SCI. 
& TECH. L. 388, 388-89 (2006). 
 30  Compare id. at 388, with James F. McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the 
Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 
EMORY L.J. 189 (2006) (arguing that patent trolls benefit society by acting as 
intermediaries in the patent market, resulting in liquidity and increased efficiency in 
the patent market). 
 31  See McDonough III, supra note 30, at 338 (arguing that patent trolls benefit 
society by acting as intermediaries in the patent market, resulting in liquidity and 
increased efficiency). 
 32  James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL 
L. REV. 387 (2014). 
 33  Katherine Lugar, Patent Troll Lawsuits Cost U.S. Economy $80 Billion Annually, 
HOTEL NEWS RES. (Oct. 29, 2013), www.hotelnewsresource.com/article74655.html. 
 34  See Malcolm & Kloster, supra note 24. 
 35  Overstock.com, Inc. v. Furnace Brook, LLC, 420 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1223 (D. 
Utah 2005). (“Unlike Congress, this court is not in a position to know how many patent 
trolls exist and how often they send letters to potential infringers (except those in their 
own state) in the hope that the letters’ recipients will opt to license their patent instead 
of paying potentially staggering litigation defense costs . . . . These matters, however, 
must be left to either Congress to resolve as a matter of statutory change or to the 
Federal Circuit as a matter of case law change.”). 
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acknowledged that they are not properly situated to make this 
determination, and that the matter should be left to Congress, which 
is better positioned to address issues related to patent trolls and the 
patent system as a whole.36  One exception to this statement is the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC),37 which has statutory 
jurisdiction allowing it to hear appeals arising from decisions made by 
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).38  The CAFC 
has taken several steps to reduce abusive patent litigation,39 but it has 
not offered a complete solution.  Despite its authority, the CAFC itself 
has stated that it must defer to Congress on issues of “judgment in 
effectuating and maintaining a patent system.”40  The regulation and 
policing of patent trolls likely falls within the scope of this statement.  
The Supreme Court of the United States has also echoed this 
sentiment.41  The judiciary’s suggestion to leave the power of policing 
and governing the patent system to Congress is not novel, however, as 
the United States Constitution explicitly gives this power to Congress.42 
Despite Congress’ enumerated power over the patent system43 and 
the deference given to Congress by the courts, police action against 
“patent trolls” now has a new enforcer—the Executive Branch.  
President Barack Obama entered the great patent troll hunt in July 
2013 when the White House issued a press release and fact sheet 
regarding the Executive Branch’s stance on the “patent troll” 
problem.44  In the statement, the White House declared that it believes 
that patent trolls “don’t actually produce anything themselves,”45 and 
that the main strategy employed by patent trolls is “to essentially 
leverage and hijack somebody else’s idea and see if they can extort 
some money out of them.”46  This understanding is consistent with the 
definitions of patent troll discussed supra.  In addition to defining 
 
 36  Id. 
 37  Id. 
 38  28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2006). 
 39  See, e.g., Kilopass Tech., Inc. v. Sidense Corp., C 10-02066 SI, 2012 WL 1534065, 
at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 1, 2012) (holding that a request for fee shifting does not require 
a “smoking gun,” but instead, requires only a misguided belief based on zealousness). 
 40  Brooks v. Dunlop Mfg. Inc., 702 F.3d 624, 632–33 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 41  See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204–05 (2003). 
 42  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 43  Id. 
 44  Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: White House Task Force on High-
Tech Patent Issues (June 4, 2013) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/06/04/fact-sheet-white-house-task-force-high-tech-patent-issues 
[hereinafter White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet]. 
 45  Id. at 2. 
 46  Id. 
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patent trolls, the White House also issued a slate of seven legislative 
suggestions and five executive actions that it believes should be 
implemented in order to curb the patent troll problem.47  Although 
the Executive Branch’s understanding of what constitutes a patent troll 
is consistent with generally accepted definitions, the White House’s 
plan to solve the patent troll problem, as will be discussed infra, is not 
focused on the generally accepted core issue of abusive patent 
litigation. 
Previous debate surrounds the issue of whether the patent system 
should be dictated by executive action and administrative law 
principles or, conversely, be subject to judicial review.48  Although the 
President is attempting to eliminate patent trolls and has not exceeded 
his Constitutional powers by merely stating his policy objectives,49 his 
entrance into the realm of patent trolls is unlikely to bring about 
significant change or to benefit the United States patent system.  
Instead, many of the proposals, particularly those that have yet to be 
thoroughly considered by Congress, are more likely to hurt the patent 
system by reducing its efficiency and making it more difficult for small 
businesses, individual inventors, and other legitimate small entities to 
seek, obtain, and exercise the rights associated with patent protection.  
Additionally, many of the suggestions are likely to further compound 
the pre-existing problems facing the American patent system, such as 
the incredible application backlog within the USPTO50—a problem 
that has only been exacerbated by sequestration51—as well as a record 
number of patent cases being brought through the courts.52 
 
 47  Id. 
 48  See generally Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law in the Administrative State, 42 WM. 
& MARY L. REV. 127 (2000). 
 49  Previous Presidents have made statements regarding patent policy, but only 
rarely.  See, e.g., John F. Kennedy, Presidential Memorandum and Statement on 
Government Patent Policy, 28 Fed. Reg. 10,943, 10,943-44 (Oct. 10, 1963) (discussing 
issues related to government acquisition of patent rights for inventions made as a result 
of a government contract). 
 50  As of December 2013, there were 595,361 unexamined patents awaiting 
examination in the USPTO.  The USPTO maintains a dynamic webpage displaying 
various performance measures for patent examination.  See Data Visualization Center, 
USPTO.GOV (last accessed Nov. 6, 2013), available at  http://www.uspto.gov/dashboar- 
ds/patents/main.dashxml. 
 51  Sequestration refers to the automatic budget cuts made in accordance with the 
Budget Control Act of 2011, S. 364, 112th Cong. (2012).  Sequestration forced the 
patent system to experience a 5% budget reduction.  See  OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, 
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON THE JOINT 
COMMITTEE SEQUESTRATION FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013 (Mar. 1, 2013), available at http:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/legislative_reports/fy13ombjcse
questrationreport.pdf. 
 52  See 2013 Patent Litigation Study, PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS LLP 5 (2013), 
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This Comment argues that the Executive Branch’s entrance into 
the patent troll hunt will be ineffective at stopping patent trolls—
perhaps even detrimental to the patent system—because it does not 
address abusive litigation tactics.  Furthermore, regulation of the 
patent system should be reserved for Congress.  Part II of this 
Comment provides a brief background of recent attempts to limit 
patent trolls, and discusses the Executive Branch’s proposals first 
offered in July 2013.  Part III evaluates the merits of each of the 
Executive Branch’s proposals and the likely impact each will have on 
both the patent system and the ending of the abusive patent litigation 
techniques often employed by patent trolls.  Part IV of this Comment 
provides alternative suggestions to help end abusive patent litigation 
without relying on presidential intervention and suggests that 
Congress thoroughly consider these options.  Part V of this Comment 
concludes that the Executive Branch’s proposals will, at best, provide 
only a marginal solution to the patent troll problem, and that the 
patent system will be better served by congressional intervention and 
consideration of ideas that have yet to be thoroughly explored. 
II.  BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW OF EXECUTIVE ACTIONS AND 
PROPOSED LEGISLATION 
A.  Previous Attempts to Stop Patent Trolls 
Congress has acknowledged that patent trolls pose a problem to 
the intellectual property industry and has taken several affirmative 
steps aimed at curbing the patent troll problem.  Congress initially 
identified patent trolls as problematic and first attempted to stop 
patent trolls when the House of Representatives proposed the Patent 
Reform Act (PRA) of 2005.53  This piece of legislation specifically 
targeted patent trolls by making it more difficult to obtain injunctive 
relief in patent litigation matters.54  Although not implemented in 
2005, this concept persevered and was included as part of the un-
enacted Patent Reform Acts of 200755 and 2009,56 until it eventually 
appeared as law in the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act57 (AIA), which 
 
available at http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/ 
2013-patent-litigation-study.pdf. 
 53  H.R. 2798, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 54  Chan & Fawcett, supra note 18, at 9 (“It appears directed (in part) to tipping 
the scales against issuing an injunction where the plaintiff is not a competitive entity 
with a business, as opposed to [a] purely financial, interest in its lawsuit.”). 
 55  H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007). 
 56  H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 57  H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. (2011) (enacted). 
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became fully effective on March 16, 2013.58 
Although the AIA is most commonly noted for forcing the 
American patent system to transition from a first-to-invent system to a 
first-inventor-to-file system,59 the law may have also made it easier for 
patent trolls to file mass applications, shifting the burden to initiate 
patent litigation onto legitimate inventive entities.60  Despite this, many 
of the provisions of the AIA were subject to criticism, and 
commentators determined that it effectively limited the rights of small 
inventors by forcing them to race to the patent office in order to secure 
patent protection for their inventions.61  The fact that many large 
corporations led the way in lobbying for the AIA to become law 
supports this criticism.62  These corporations include Fortune 500 
names such as Apple, Cisco, Google, HP, Microsoft, and Intel, all of 
which have impressive patent portfolios.63 
In order to counteract some of the negative effects caused by 
stepping away from a first-to-invent system, the AIA also provides 
smaller inventors with minor relief through the creation of a new 
“micro-entity” status.64  By allowing certain individuals who certify their 
status as a small entity65 to pay fees that are reduced by as much as 75 
percent,66 Congress reduced the financial burden many small 
inventors, who traditionally lack a strong financial backing when 
applying for a patent, faced.  Because certification of “micro-entity” 
status also requires that a patent seeker file only a limited number of 
patents,67 Congress also ensured that patent trolls would not be able to 
easily abuse the benefits of this status by filing a large volume of 
applications to create a portfolio of non-practiced inventions. 
 
 58  Id. 
 59  See 35 U.S.C. § 100(i) (2006). 
 60  Paul R. Gupta & Alex Feerst, The US Patent System After the Leahy-Smith America 
Invents Act, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 1, 2012, at 60, 61 (2012). 
 61  See, e.g., Jennifer L. Case, How the America Invents Act Hurts American Inventors and 
Weakens Incentives to Innovate, 82 UMKC L. REV. 29 (2013). 
 62  See Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism and Patent Law Reform, 85 IND. L.J. 
449, 451 (2010). 
 63  Case, supra note 61, at 46. 
 64  35 U.S.C. § 123 (2006). 
 65  The requirements necessary for an inventive entity to be classified as a small 
entity permitting the payment of small entity fees are outlined in 37 C.F.R. § 1.27(a) 
(2013). 
 66  Certified small entities are eligible for a fifty percent fee reduction while 
certified micro entities are eligible for a seventy-five percent fee reduction.  35 U.S.C. 
§ 123 (2012). 
 67  Id. § 123(a)(2). 
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B.  Presidential Intervention 
Shortly after the AIA went into full effect on March 16, 2013, the 
Executive Branch issued a press release describing its plan to solve the 
patent troll problem through five Executive Actions and seven 
legislative suggestions.68  Despite two broad categories of suggestions, 
there is significant overlap between many of the proposed initiatives.  
This section briefly explains the Executive Actions and the Executive 
Branch’s proposed legislation—along with each item’s intended effect 
on the patent system—in order to provide the background necessary 
for meaningful evaluation of how these proposals are likely to affect 
both patent trolls and innocent bystanders.  Further discussion of the 
impacts of each proposal appears in Part III of this Comment, infra. 
1.  The President’s Executive Actions 
Through its first proposed Executive Action focused on patent 
trolls, the White House explained how it plans to implement a “Real 
Party of Interest”69 requirement for patent applicants and patent 
holders.  This initiative would require patent applicants and owners to 
regularly update ownership and assignment information when 
practicing before the USPTO.70  Under the proposal, this information 
would be required whenever a new patent application is filed, a patent 
is issued, a patent is assigned, or a patent maintenance fee is paid. 
The Executive Branch’s second action is aimed at “tightening 
functional claiming.”71  This proposal intends to make it more difficult 
for an applicant who claims an abstract or overly broad invention to be 
issued a patent.  This provision also gives direction to the USPTO to 
implement new training that will help patent examiners further 
scrutinize overly broad claims.72  This adds to the restrictions imposed 
by the AIA, which places limitations on certain method claims such as 
tax strategies.73 
The third Executive Action hopes to “empower downstream 
users.”74  In addition to targeting product makers and sellers, patent 
trolls sometimes also target the end-users of allegedly infringing 
 
 68  White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44. 
 69  White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44.  
 70  White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44.   
 71  White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44.   
 72  White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44.   
 73  See H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 14 (2011); see also Nichelle Closson, Comment, Tax 
Strategy Patents after the American Invents Act: The Need for Judicial Action, 38 IOWA J. CORP. 
L. 159 (2012). 
 74  White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44. 
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inventions.  For example, some trolls have chosen to target businesses 
that use common technologies such as point-of-sale software75 and free 
public Wi-Fi.76  Another patent troll has even claimed that any person 
or business who sends JPEG images via email has infringed one of his 
patents.77  In many of these cases, patent trolls usually target small 
mom-and-pop retailers, hotels, or coffee shops that are unlikely to be 
fully aware of their legal rights.78  This Executive Action aims to stymie 
these infringement claims by providing educational materials to the 
public, which explain the basic steps someone should take when an 
infringement action is brought against him. 
The White House’s fourth Executive Action aimed at stopping 
patent trolls is to “expand dedicated outreach and study.”79  This 
scholarly provision intends to encourage intellectual growth within the 
patent system.  Specifically, it aims to foster ongoing correspondence 
and roundtable discussions among the American patent system’s 
stakeholders, including federal agencies involved in the enforcement 
of patent rights such as the USPTO, the Department of Justice, and the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC).  The White House intends to 
implement this Executive Action by hosting “six months of high-profile 
events across the country to develop new ideas and consensus around 
updates to patent policies and laws.”80  Furthermore, the White House 
stated its goal to expand the USPTO’s Edison Scholars Program by 
engaging more academic experts to conduct research and share data 
that may have an impact on issues related to abusive litigation.81  
Unfortunately, as will be discussed in greater detail below, these 
educational efforts will likely fall short of actually addressing the 
problems that stem from patent trolls’ abusive litigation tactics. 
 
 
 
 
 75  White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44.   
 76  Mike Masnick, Patent Troll Says Anyone Using WiFi Infringes; Won’t Sue Individuals 
‘At This Stage’, TECHDIRT.COM (Oct. 3, 2011, 11:28 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/ 
blog/wireless/articles/20111001/00365416161/patent-troll-says-anyone-using-wifi-
infringes-wont-sue-individuals-this-stage.shtml. 
 77  Laura Sydell, Taking the Battle against Patent Trolls to the Public, NAT’L PUB. RADIO 
(Aug. 30, 2013, 5:21 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2013/08/ 
30/217272814/taking-the-battle-against-patent-trolls-to-the-public/. 
 78  See Gregory Thomas, Innovatio’s Infringement Suit Rampage Expands to Corporate 
Hotels, THE PATENT EXAM’R (Sept. 30, 2011), http://www.patentexaminer.org/2011/ 
09/innovatios-infringement-suit-rampage-expands-to-corporate-hotels/. 
 79  White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44. 
 80  White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44. 
 81  White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44. 
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The fifth and final Executive Action proposed by the Executive 
Branch is to strengthen the enforcement process of exclusion orders.82  
This action takes aim at international patent infringers.  Currently, 
when the International Trade Commission (ITC) determines that an 
imported or exported product is infringing another party’s patent, it 
consults with United States Customs and Border Protection—an 
agency within the United States Department of Homeland Security—
to enforce an exclusion order.83  Sometimes, however, only a minor 
product change can be sufficient to allow an infringer to escape the 
scope of the exclusion order, thus bypassing it completely.84  This 
provision states that the United States Intellectual Property Officer will 
investigate enforcement activities and work with the ITC on finding 
improvements that will help make the process more efficient, effective, 
and transparent.85 
2.  The President’s Legislative Proposals 
In addition to the aforementioned Executive Actions, President 
Obama also suggested seven pieces of legislation.  Many of these 
legislative proposals mirror the implementations specified in the 
Executive Actions, and therefore, do not operate independently.  For 
instance, both the Executive Actions and legislative proposals contain 
provisions pertaining to the “real party of interest,” thereby protecting 
end-users and empowering the ITC.  Despite this, there are several 
legislative proposals that are not encompassed in the Executive 
Actions. 
The first proposed legislative action is related to the first 
Executive Action, in that it is focused on providing transparency by 
creating a “real party of interest” standard within the patent system.86  
Although this proposal may seem novel, it has already been discussed 
in Congress and proposed in legislation such as the End Anonymous 
Patents (EAP) Act.87  The EAP Act requires the real party of interest be 
identified at the time a new patent is issued, at the time maintenance 
fees are paid, and within ninety days of any action in which the 
 
 82  White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44. 
 83  See About the United States International Trade Commission, U.S. INT’L TRADE 
COMM’N, http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/about_usitc.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 
2014). 
 84  See Timothy Q. Li, Essay, Exclusion Is Not Automatic: Improving the Enforcement of 
ITC Exclusion Orders Through Notice, a Test for Close Cases, and Civil Penalties, 81 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1755 (2013). 
 85  White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44. 
 86  White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44.  
 87  H.R. 2024, 113th Cong. (2013). 
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ownership interest in a patent or a patent application is sold, granted, 
or conveyed.88 
Next, the White House stated that it would like to give courts more 
discretion when determining whether a prevailing party in a patent 
case is entitled to fees.89  This would require modifying 35 U.S.C. § 285, 
which covers sanctions in patent lawsuits.  The Executive Branch 
suggests adopting a standard similar to that which currently applies to 
copyright infringement cases, where the courts have discretion to 
“allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party other than the 
United States.”90  Similar to the standard used for copyright 
infringement91, this modification would allow for the recovery of 
reasonable attorney’s fees. 
The President’s third legislative suggestion is to expand the 
USPTO’s transitional program.92  This would permit a wider range of 
challengers to petition for review of issued patents before the Patent 
Trial and Appeals Board (PTAB).93  The goal of this suggestion is to 
make it easier for third-parties to challenge the validity of computer-
enabled and software patents.94  The idea is that patent trolls who seek 
overly broad business method and computer-based patents would be 
targeted, their claims would be declared invalid, and they would then 
be unable to exploit their patents against third-parties.  Therefore, 
rather than targeting abusive litigation, this proposal aims to make it 
more difficult to obtain a patent in the first place and expands the 
scope of challenges currently facing the PTAB.95 
The fourth legislative proposal is markedly similar to the third 
Executive Action in that it also intends to help protect end-users of 
products.96  This proposal aims to provide protection to end-users who 
purchase and use a product for its intended purpose.  The proposal 
also suggests staying judicial proceedings against end users when a 
vendor, retailer, or manufacturer is also being sued under the same 
allegations of infringement.97  Therefore, while this proposal intends 
to protect end-users from frivolous infringement actions, it truly just 
 
 88  Id. 
 89  White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44. 
 90  17 U.S.C. § 505 (2012). 
 91  Id. 
 92  White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44. 
 93  White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44. 
 94  White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44. 
 95  Similarly to the USPTO, the PTAB is currently experiencing a severe backlog of 
ex parte appeals.  See Data Visualization Center, supra note 50. 
 96  White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44. 
 97  White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44. 
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changes the party that is likely to be sued by a patent troll.  Admittedly, 
this may protect innocent victims who cannot afford to put on their 
own defenses, but it does not stop patent trolls from initiating abusive 
litigation, although it may make them less confident in their litigation 
tactics. 
The Executive Branch’s fifth legislative suggestion is to change 
the ITC standard for obtaining an injunction.98  Since the ITC is a 
federal agency and not a court, it does not always follow the rules set 
forth by the Supreme Court and is not bound by Supreme Court 
decisions or precedent.99  Despite this, aggrieved parties can file an 
appeal from an ITC decision in federal court.100  This creates an 
incredible strategic advantage for a patent troll who can 
simultaneously pursue an alleged infringer in both the court system 
and the ITC by claiming that it has become the victim of an “unfair 
trade practice.”101  Additionally, the Executive Branch suggests that the 
four-factor test used in eBay v. MercExchange102 be adopted by the ITC 
to require a plaintiff to show that he has been irreparably harmed, that 
remedies available at law are inadequate to compensate him for the 
alleged injury, that a remedy of equity is permissible, and that the 
public interest would not be disserved by the issuance of a permanent 
injunction.103 
A sixth legislative recommendation has the goal of stopping 
abusive lawsuits by requiring that demand letters be more 
transparent.104  In order to implement this process, the legislative 
recommendation suggests incentivizing the public filing of demand 
letters in such a way that they are easily accessible and easily searchable 
to the public.  This proposal is closely related to the “real party of 
interest” recommendations found in the Executive Branch’s first 
Executive Action and first legislative proposal, and intends to enable 
the public to become more aware of the names of businesses and 
persons who file large volumes of infringement actions. 
 
 
 
 98  White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44. 
 99  See, e.g., 2 Admin. L. & Prac. § 5:67 (Charles H. Koch, Jr., 3d ed. 2010). 
 100  See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(c) (2012). 
 101  See Colleen V. Chien, Patently Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Patent Cases at 
the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 63 (2008) (discussing how 
patent trolls often make use of the court system and the ITC simultaneously in order 
to bring an infringement action). 
 102  547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
 103  Id. 
 104  White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44. 
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The final legislative proposal seeks to grant the ITC more 
flexibility in hiring Administrative Law Judges.105  This proposal is likely 
being used to encourage the ITC to hire additional judges so that it 
can meet the demands of the increased case load it has experienced in 
recent years.106  As will be discussed infra, however, this proposal is 
largely unrelated to the patent troll problem, despite its possible 
benefits. 
III.  ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF THE EXECUTIVE ACTIONS AND 
PROPOSED LEGISLATION 
As discussed above, Congress has typically been left with the task 
of creating laws related to the patent system because this power is 
specifically provided for in the United States Constitution.107  This is 
one reason why it is particularly interesting that the White House has 
decided to enter and police the patent realm.  Not only is it rare for 
the President to explicitly direct the policies and rules surrounding 
patent law,108 but it may also be a cause for concern as the Executive 
Branch may not have the proper knowledge or experience to bring 
about effective changes within the intellectual property system.  
Although the President’s suggestions try to cover many different 
aspects of the patent system, they lack a clear and defined focus.109  
Additionally, the Executive Branch’s lack of expertise causes it to fail 
to adequately address the most critical way in which patent trolls 
exploit the patent system: abusive patent litigation.  Furthermore, in 
acknowledging the severity of the patent troll problem, the President 
himself has called on Congress—the appropriate body to address such 
an issue—to take the steps necessary to put a stop to abusive patent 
litigation.110 
 
 105  White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44. 
 106  From FY 2000 to FY 2011the ITC’s Section 337 caseload for investigations into 
allegations of unfair practices in import trade had increased by over 530 percent.  See 
Conversations with the Honorable Dick Thornburgh, Deanna Tanner Okun, Paul Roeder, 
WASHINGTON LEGAL FOUNDATION (Spring 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/ 
atr/public/workshops/pae/comments/paew-0041b.pdf. 
 107  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 108  See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 49. 
 109  In the seven legislative recommendations and five Executive Actions, many 
different areas of the patent system are discussed, including ITC involvement, the basis 
on which patents should be granted, the identification of patent holders during the 
course of litigation, and the provision of education and protections to the public.  
None of these directly addresses limiting the number of abusive lawsuits filed or  how 
to make it more difficult for a party to initiate an abusive patent infringement action.  
See White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 44. 
 110  Barack Obama, President of the United States of America, State of the Union 
Address (Jan. 28, 2014) (“And let’s pass a patent reform bill that allows our businesses 
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As discussed supra, abusive patent litigation has significant 
implications for the United States economy,111 and it is unlikely that the 
patent troll problem will fix itself in the near future.  More likely, the 
problem will continue to expand until abusive litigation is effectively 
ended by new legislation.  Patent trolls are estimated to have accounted 
for approximately sixty-two percent of patent litigation as of 2012.112  
This constitutes approximately 2,900 lawsuits per year113 and represents 
a significant increase over estimates from prior years.114  Furthermore, 
patent trolls often try to name multiple defendants in order to 
maximize their probability of recovery in lawsuits via settlements, 
licensing agreements or, more rarely, verdicts and judgments.115  These 
numbers emphasize the importance of ending abusive litigation 
practices, a sentiment echoed by former CAFC Chief Judge, Randall R. 
Rader.116 
In addition, many of the Executive Branch’s suggestions have 
already been addressed by Congress through proposed legislation.  
Once a piece of legislation is presented to Congress, it is usually 
recommended to a committee that has specialized expertise in 
evaluating whether the proposal will be effective and can be 
implemented in a manner such that its negative consequences are 
minimized.  This technique, rather than presidential intervention, is 
much more likely to be effective in eliminating abusive patent 
litigation and will be discussed more thoroughly in Part IV, infra. 
A.  Proposals Affecting Patentee Identification 
Many of the White House’s proposals are focused on greater 
transparency and more effective identification of patent holders.  The 
“real party of interest” requirements embodied in the first Executive 
Action and first legislative proposal, along with the encouragement of 
demand letter transparency in accordance with legislative 
recommendation six, are primarily focused on preventing a patent 
troll from hiding within a “shell” entity. 
 
to stay focused on innovation, not costly, needless litigation.”). 
 111  See Bessen & Meurer, supra note 32. 
 112  See Colleen V. Chien, Patent Trolls by the Numbers, SANTA CLARA LAW DIGITAL 
COMMONS (Mar. 3, 2013), available at http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs/ 
609/. 
 113  Id. 
 114  Id. 
 115  Id. 
 116  See, e.g., Randall R. Rader, Make Patent Trolls Pay in Court, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/make-patent-trolls-pay-in-
court.html. 
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Analysts throughout the intellectual property community 
anticipate that these provisions will only have a “de minimis impact,” 
in part because “patent trolls don’t profit from anonymity.”117  Effective 
patent trolls view their activity as a business model, not as a game of 
secrecy.  Although it is true that patent trolls often do try to hide their 
identities through the use of “shell” companies in an attempt to avoid 
counterclaims,118 trolls are not concerned with whether third parties 
know who they are, so long as they are still turning a profit.119  This is 
illustrated by the fact that although some of the most tenacious patent 
troll entities—such as Intellectual Ventures, which is known to have 
over 1,200 shell companies with a worldwide patent portfolio 
containing approximately 60,000 patents120—have received massive 
amounts of negative publicity, they continue to play the patent troll 
game of trying to obtain licensing fees through abusive litigation based 
on illegitimate claims of patent infringement. 
In addition to inadequately combating patent trolls, there is also 
the possibility that these provisions will have a negative impact on small 
inventive entities.  For instance, the “real party of interest” provisions 
may enable large companies to find smaller parties who hold the legal 
rights to various inventions but wish to remain secret.  Larger 
corporations may attempt to use identifying information to their 
advantage by overpowering smaller companies with threats of costly 
litigation or the use of corporate espionage.121  Alternatively, larger 
companies may intentionally infringe against a smaller entity that they 
know does not have adequate resources to protect its own patent 
rights.  If a large company is infringing a small inventor’s invention, 
that inventor may not have the financial capability to bring an 
infringement action, or he may simply choose not to bring an action 
because he is certain that he will not be able to win against a larger 
company full of lawyers and financial resources. 
 
 
 117  Hsieh, Sylvia, Will Obama’s Proposals Rein in Patent Trolls?, THE DAILY RECORD 
NEWSWIRE (June 12, 2013), available at http://www.legalnews.com/detroit/1377007/ 
(quoting Anthony Biller). 
 118  Daniel J. McFeely, Comment, An Argument for Restricting the Patent Rights to Those 
Who Misuse the U.S. Patent System to Earn Money Through Litigation, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 289, 
294 (2008). 
 119  Id. 
 120  Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 
24 (2012). 
 121  Corporate espionage refers to uncovering a competitor’s trade secrets, business 
methods, intellectual property, or other secret information by dishonest means.  See 
18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2012). 
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Although larger companies may use the “real party of interest” 
requirement to their advantage, they are not entirely immune to the 
possible negative effects of this provision.  By being forced to disclose 
the “real party of interest,” companies may be required to provide 
information that exposes their otherwise confidential, commercial 
business strategies, such as the specific corporate structure used to 
manage their intellectual property.  Therefore, the ability of larger 
corporations to implement effective intellectual property 
management techniques may become limited.122  These limitations 
may hurt these companies’ economic growth and add additional 
management burdens. 
As a whole, “real party of interest” requirements do not effectively 
combat the patent troll problem.  Of course, these requirements allow 
a defendant facing patent-infringement charges to have more clarity 
in identifying the party who has sued him, but this does not stop an 
abusive infringement lawsuit from being filed in the first place.  
Without doing anything to effectively reduce the number of lawsuits 
patent trolls file, the patent troll problem cannot be adequately 
addressed simply through greater transparency and “real party of 
interest” requirements. 
B.  Educational Efforts and End User Protections 
A second broad category of the White House’s proposals to stop 
patent trolls is aimed at education.  In many instances, the goal of 
education is to protect end-users from abusive litigation.  While 
educating the public is a noble cause based primarily on good 
intentions, it is hard to see how these proposals will be able to 
effectively stop patent trolls from initiating abusive litigation. 
The public is not completely unaware of the problems associated 
with patent trolls.  Patent trolls and their abusive litigation tactics are 
often publicized in the media, thus creating public awareness.123  Of 
course, it is impossible to document or publicize every instance of 
 
 122  For an overview of emerging intellectual property management techniques, see 
William W. Fisher III & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Strategic Management of Intellectual 
Property – An Integrated Approach, CAL. MGMT. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) (Feb. 17, 2013), 
available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/faculty-workshops/fisher.faculty. 
workshop.summer-2013.pdf. 
 123  Simply searching for “patent trolls” on an Internet news search engine yields a 
significant number of results related to patent trolls, and a significant number of the 
results have negative connotations associated with them.  See, e.g., Edward J. Black, 
Senate Needs to Stop Patent Trolls, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 3, 2014, 3:04 PM), http:// 
www.huffingtonpost.com/edward-j-black/senate-needs-to-stop-patenttrolls_b_469646 
6.html.   
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abusive litigation brought forth by a patent troll, but the general public 
has been put on notice about the tactics and effects of patent trolls.  
Furthermore, designation as a “patent troll” comes with a largely 
pejorative meaning.124  Even someone who is unfamiliar with the 
commonly used definitions of patent troll would at least be able to 
ascertain the negative connotation associated with the word “troll.” 
Within the intellectual property community, patent trolls receive 
even more scrutiny than they do in society at large.  Law review articles 
discussing patent trolls have been published since the term first came 
into use.  Patent-focused websites and blogs, such as Patently-O, have 
thousands of users125 that actively discuss issues facing the patent 
system, including trolls.  Many of these users are patent examiners, 
registered patent agents, or licensed patent attorneys—all of whom are 
active stakeholders in the intellectual property community.  In many 
of these conversations, strategies to end abusive litigation are 
discussed, and patent trolls are further vilified for their abuse of the 
patent system. 
Even if education provides the general public with the knowledge 
necessary to evade a patent troll, this effort will only go so far.  Shortly 
after implementation, the general public may have a slightly increased 
understanding of how the patent system works and the threats that 
patent trolls pose.  This understanding, however, does nothing to 
impede the efforts of patent trolls.  Patent trolls will still be able to file 
lawsuits in the same manner and volume that they do today, and the 
only benefit to an unsuspecting defendant is that he now knows the 
definition of a patent troll.  Furthermore, many patent trolls are very 
profitable and can easily spend money on expensive legal counsel or 
other expenditures to keep their business going, even if more 
knowledgeable defendants become less willing to quickly back down 
or settle.126  Because of this, any educational efforts in place would 
require continuous updating in order to be relevant and effective. 
Educational efforts alone will not be able to end the abusive 
patent litigation used by patent trolls, given that patent trolls are 
already an identified problem.  Because of this, it is unlikely that these 
efforts will have a significant impact, if any, on the abusive tactics 
commonly employed by patent trolls in the near future.  Despite these 
inadequacies, improving education about the patent system and the 
dangers of patent trolls may be a worthwhile expenditure if properly 
 
 124  Sandberg, supra note 13.  
 125  Patently-O advertises that it has over 19,000 daily subscribers.  See PATENTLY-O, 
http://www.patentlyo.com (last visited Nov. 6, 2013). 
 126  See Schumer, supra note 26. 
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implemented.  Rather than combating the patent troll problem, 
constant updating of educational materials related to the patent system 
based on the input of various stakeholders could potentially provide a 
greater understanding of the American patent system as a whole and 
encourage further innovation. 
C.  Tightened Functional Claiming 
The President’s suggestion to tighten functional claiming builds 
upon the AIA’s efforts to prevent overly broad patents from being 
issued in the first place.  Although the patent system’s integrity relies 
on the fact that only deserving inventions should receive patent 
protection, current provisions already address this concern by 
requiring that a patent be novel, useful, and non-obvious.127  As 
discussed infra, while it may be true that not all patents are truly useful 
inventions in the eyes of many, the Executive Branch’s suggestion to 
tighten functional claiming is unlikely to stop patent trolls and may 
pose a significant risk to small inventors seeking patent protection. 
Many patent trolls do not even create their own inventions.  
Instead, they acquire the rights to a patent on the open market.128  
Consequently, making it more difficult for certain types of inventions 
to receive patent protection is unlikely to limit the effectiveness of 
patent trolls because trolls will continue to purchase the rights to 
already issued patents.  By purchasing existing patents, larger patent 
trolls do not have to spend significant amounts of money or assume 
any of the risks associated with obtaining patent protection.  
Therefore, if this provision were to have any impact on patent trolls, it 
would be only on those holding a small number of self-made 
inventions.  Although these smaller entities may sometimes be patent 
trolls according to common definitions, they are not at the root of the 
patent troll problem. 
Moreover, stricter limitations on functional claiming will 
complicate the process by which an inventor gets a patent.  This 
provision would increase scrutiny from the USPTO and require the 
inventor to take extra steps in preparing his application if he hopes to 
have a patent issued.  For instance, inventors and patent applicants 
would likely be required to establish detailed glossaries explicitly 
defining even common terms, thus placing an additional burden on 
both patent applicants and patent prosecutors.  Furthermore—and 
 
 127  See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03 (2012). 
 128  See, e.g., Daniel J. McFeely, Note, An Argument for Restricting the Patent Rights to 
Those Who Misuse the U.S. Patent System to Earn Money Through Litigation, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
289, 294 (2008).  
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perhaps even more detrimental to the core tenants of the American 
patent system—under this proposal an unsophisticated individual 
inventor who has filed his own patent application may have his 
invention denied not because he has failed to meet the criteria for 
patentability, but rather, because he has used overly broad language.  
These procedural complications affect not only inventors and patent 
prosecutors, but they will also compound the USPTO’s current 
backlog and staffing shortages.129 
Overall, despites their intentions, proposals aimed at tightening 
functional claiming will not effectively help cure the patent troll 
problem.  Furthermore, the potential negative consequences of these 
proposals are serious and may actually lead to both new and increased 
problems and complications within the patent system. 
D.  ITC Reform 
A number of the President’s suggestions—legislative proposals 
five and seven as well as the fifth Executive Action—focus on taking 
steps to reform the way in which the ITC handles patent matters.  
Although these proposals contain elements that may benefit the patent 
system, they do not adequately address issues related to patent trolls’ 
abusive litigation strategies.  For instance, while granting the ITC more 
flexibility in its hiring processes may help the organization better 
manage its caseload,130 this does not directly affect patent trolls.  
Instead, this would likely help address issues of international 
infringement, as the ITC would be able to reach quicker resolutions 
and operate more efficiently.  Despite this, hiring flexibility still does 
not address patent trolls. 
The only ITC provision that may help curb patent trolls and 
abusive litigation is the suggestion that the ITC adopt the four-part test 
set forth in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange131 prior to the court’s granting an 
injunction.  Even with this provision, however, the overall effects of the 
efforts aimed at reforming the ITC would be marginal, although, once 
again, the ITC would be able to operate more efficiently and expedite 
the way in which it handles issues related to unfair trade practices.  
Unfortunately, this does not directly address the issues associated with 
patent trolls.  Luckily, however, despite the shortcomings and negative 
consequences of several of the Executive’s other proposals, the 
measures involving changes to the ITC do not have significant negative 
 
 129  Data Visualization Center, supra note 50. 
 130  Conversations, supra note 105. 
 131  547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
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impacts on small inventors or the overall patent system as a whole, and 
would likely produce several benefits. 
IV.  PROPOSED ALTERNATIVES 
The Executive Branch’s proposals include several good ideas, but 
will be largely ineffective at actually stopping patent trolls and their 
abusive litigation strategies.  Although the President has a cabinet in 
place that can advise him about the needs of various government 
agencies and entities, the ability of this cabinet to effectively assess and 
manage these needs pales in comparison to Congress’.  With over 
forty132 Congressional committees subdivided to create over one 
hundred133 congressional subcommittees,134 Congress has the unique 
ability to hold hearings in which it can obtain input from various 
stakeholders, thus enabling its members to make informed decisions 
regarding proposed changes, and providing lawmakers with access to 
a wide variety of differing points of view.  This oversight allows not only 
for broad reform, but also for the ability to choose individual elements 
of patent reform in a piecemeal manner, which is likely a better 
approach to effectively evolving and moderating the patent system.135  
Furthermore, as discussed supra, the United States Constitution 
explicitly grants Congress power over the patent and copyright 
systems,136 and the other branches of the federal government should 
not usurp this power. 
Despite the Executive Branch’s well-intentioned efforts to put an 
end to patent trolls, there are other alternatives available, which have 
the following advantages: small inventors are not put at a 
disproportionate disadvantage; significant burdens are not placed on 
the USPTO; and abusive litigation practices are more effectively 
deterred.  This section will discuss (1) Congress’ legislative efforts to 
stop patent trolls, (2) proposals aimed at reducing the burden that 
smaller inventive entities face, (3) alternative policing methods to 
catch patent trolls, and (4) the techniques available to legitimate 
 
 132  As of December 2013, the United States House of Representatives had twenty-
one committees, and the United States Senate had twenty-one committees.  For a full 
list of current Congressional committees, see https://www.congress.gov/committees.  
 133  The United States House of Representatives has ninety-five subcommittees.  
The United States Senate has sixty-eight subcommittees.  Id. 
 134  Congressional subcommittees consider the details and specifics of a matter and 
then report back to the full committee with their results. See 5 U.S.C. app. § 5 (2013). 
 135  See Christopher Norton, Retired Fed. Circ. Chief Urges Piecemeal Patent Reform, 
LAW360 (Jan. 12, 2011, 5:18PM), http://www.law360.com/ip/articles/219706/ 
retired-fed-circ-chief-urges-piecemeal-patent-reform. 
 136  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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patent holders that wish to bring a valid infringement action to 
distinguish themselves from patent trolls. 
A.  Legislative Efforts 
The most traditional way in which Congress can attempt to modify 
patent law and the patent system is through legislation.  At any given 
time, there may be thousands of bills present before Congress.137  Each 
is presented, evaluated by a committee or subcommittee, and 
ultimately either approved or discarded due to votes in each house of 
Congress.138  Then, the law is either enacted by the President’s 
signature or vetoed.139  As will be discussed infra, Congress’ attempts to 
stop patent trolls have focused primarily on issues related to abusive 
patent litigation.  Conversely, as argued in this Comment, the 
Executive’s focus does not sufficiently address abusive patent litigation, 
and instead, focuses on alternative methods that are unlikely to harm 
patent trolls. 
1.  Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal 
Disputes Act of 2013 
Perhaps the most effective method to stop patent trolls and the 
abusive litigation they often unjustly initiate involves the incorporation 
of several provisions contained in the “Saving High-Tech Innovators 
from Egregious Legal Disputes (SHIELD) Act of 2013,”140 which 
originally appeared before Congress in 2012.  Following its 
introduction, the SHIELD Act was amended to be more inclusive of 
non-software and non-computer-related patents and was reintroduced 
in 2013.141  The SHIELD Act was referred to the Subcommittee on 
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet in April of 2013, but a 
vote on the bill has yet to take place.142 
The SHIELD Act is narrowly focused on ending abusive patent 
litigation.  The Act includes a provision that requires a party bringing 
a patent infringement or patent invalidation lawsuit to post a bond, the 
 
 137  As of November 4, 2013, there are 5,969 bills currently before Congress.  To 
track the status of bills and resolutions, see Bills and Resolutions, GOVTRACK.US, 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills (last accessed Nov. 6, 2013). 
 138  See The Legislative Process: How a Bill Becomes a Law and Legislative Terms, 
NAT’L MENTORING P’SHIP (Sept. 2010), http://www.mentoring.org/downloads/men- 
toring_1278.pdf. 
 139  Id. 
 140  H.R. 6245, 112th Cong. (2012). 
 141  H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 142  H.R. 845 Actions, 113th Cong. (2013), available at http://beta.congress.gov/ 
bill/113th/house-bill/845/actions  
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amount of which is determined by the court, to cover the costs of the 
litigation.143  The bond requirement would likely reduce the overall 
number of infringement actions as parties would likely be hesitant to 
file an infringement lawsuit unless they were certain that they would 
be successful.  Although this provision may appear to create a burden 
on small inventors wishing to exercise their rights in an infringement 
suit, there are several exceptions to the bond requirement, easing the 
burden on certain inventive entities. 
Original inventors,144 original assignees,145 patentees who can 
provide documentation that they have taken significant steps or made 
a significant investment in using the patent,146 universities,147 and other 
recognized technology transfer organizations148 are all exempt from 
the bond requirement.  Additionally, even in instances where a 
plaintiff fails to meet one of these criteria, the court has discretion to 
determine whether a bond should still be assessed.149  This allows a 
court to evaluate whether a party has a legitimate claim or is actually a 
patent troll who is bringing a frivolous or abusive lawsuit prior to 
initiating a bond requirement.  The Executive Branch’s suggestions do 
not contain, and do not communicate a need for, the judicial 
discretion necessary to ensure fairness in patent litigation. 
Overall, the proposed implementation of the SHIELD Act 
presents a unique balance that is likely to reduce the number of 
frivolous patent infringement and patent invalidation lawsuits, while 
simultaneously preserving the rights of small inventors and non-profit 
innovators.  By reducing the number of lawsuits, a bond provision such 
as that contained in the SHIELD Act could effectively reduce the 
patent troll problem and decrease caseload burdens before the PTAB 
and other courts.  The general public would no longer be as severely 
threatened by patent trolls, and small inventors would not have their 
rights restricted or dissolved.  In conjunction with other possible 
solutions, a bond requirement could become the beginning of the end 
of the patent troll problem. 
 
 
 143  H.R. 845(b), 113th Cong. (2013). 
 144  H.R. 845(d)(1), 113th Cong. (2013). 
 145  Id. 
 146  H.R. 845(d)(2), 113th Cong. (2013). 
 147  H.R. 845(d)(3)(A), 113th Cong. (2013). 
 148  H.R. 845 (d)(3)(B), 113th Cong. (2013). 
 149  H.R. 845(b), 113th Cong. (2013). 
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2.  Patent Abuse Reduction Act 
A second piece of proposed legislation that is currently before 
Congress and is also aimed at reducing abusive patent litigation is the 
“Patent Abuse Reduction (PAR) Act of 2013,”150 which was presented 
in May of 2013151 and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.152  
The PAR Act introduces advanced pleading requirements, sets forth 
procedures for joinder of parties, places restrictions on the discovery 
process, defines relevant evidence, and allows courts to award the 
prevailing party reasonable costs and expenses, including attorney’s 
fees, in certain situations.153  Similar to the SHIELD Act, the PAR Act 
includes a bond provision, but this is limited to requiring a party to 
post bond only to cover the anticipated costs of discovery when that 
party requests discovery outside the scope of the PAR Act.154 
Like the SHIELD Act, the bond provision could deter abusive 
litigants.  Unfortunately, the PAR Act’s use of a bond requirement is 
not as elegant as the SHIELD Act’s because it does not provide the 
same balance used to protect the rights of small and individual 
inventors.  The PAR Act demonstrates that although there are some 
general concepts—such as bond provisions—that seem to help address 
the patent troll problem, the specifics surrounding their 
implementation are crucial, as a one-size-fits-all approach would likely 
have a disproportionately negative impact on some parties.  Therefore, 
legislators should focus on passing a bond provision similar to that of 
the SHIELD Act, which provides relief for small inventive entities. 
3.  Patent Litigation and Innovation Act 
The Patent Litigation and Innovation (PLI) Act of 2013155 is yet 
another piece of legislation currently before Congress with the goal of 
stopping patent trolls from engaging in abusive litigation.  The PLI Act 
sets forth new standards in pleadings, requiring a plaintiff in a patent 
infringement case to fully identify the claims allegedly infringed, to 
specify clear instances of infringement, and to disclose the “real party 
of interest.”  Although the PLI Act’s “real party of interest” may seem 
similar to that proposed by the Executive Branch, it is markedly 
 
 150  S. 1013, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 151  159 CONG. REC. 3763–65 (daily ed. May 22, 2013) (statement of Sen. Cornyn). 
 152  For congressional actions taken on S. 1013, 113th Cong. (2013), see S.103 – 
Patent Abuse Reduction Act of 2013, CONGRESS.GOV, http://beta.congress.gov/bill/ 
113th/senate-bill/1013/titles (last accessed Dec. 4, 2013). 
 153  S. 1013, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 154  S. 1013 § 4(b)(3)(B)(ii)(II), 113th Cong. (2013). 
 155  H.R. 2639, 113th Cong. (2013). 
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different in that, rather than requiring identification of the “real party 
of interest” whenever the patent is discussed before the USPTO, it 
requires disclosure only at the commencement of an infringement 
action. 
This nuance mitigates many of the negative consequences of the 
President’s “real party of interest” requirement discussed supra, while 
still maintaining the overall goal of preventing patent trolls from 
hiding behind a “shell” during the course of patent litigation.  
Furthermore, while the PLI Act would make the requirements for 
pleadings in a patent infringement case more rigid, they are not 
complex or difficult to decipher.  This is an important distinction 
because strict, yet simple, pleading requirements do not place a 
significant burden on a party attempting to bring a legitimate patent 
infringement action. 
The PLI Act also takes steps to simplify the discovery process by 
limiting discovery material to core documents, such as identifying 
information and documentation specific to the operation of the 
alleged infringing invention.156  If enacted, the PLI Act would also limit 
discovery until claim construction157 has been completed by the court 
during the course of a Markman158 hearing.159  Currently, patent trolls 
sometimes abuse the discovery process by requesting millions of 
documents160 in an attempt to pressure the opposing party into settling 
the lawsuit.161  The imposition of discovery limitations as proposed by 
the PLI Act would effectively disarm patent trolls of one of their most 
effective weapons, and therefore, reduce their overall success rates. 
4.  Other Legislative Proposals 
In addition to the aforementioned bills currently before 
Congress, there are several other pieces of proposed legislation that 
encompass similar ideas aimed at combating patent trolls.  These bills 
include the Patent Innovation Protection Act,162 the Stopping 
 
 156  Id. 
 157  “Claim construction” refers to “the interpretation and construction of patent 
claims, which define the scope of the patentee’s rights under the patent,” which is a 
process carried out by the court.  See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 
967, 970–71 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
 158  Id. 
 159  H.R. 2639, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 160  Abusive Patent Litigation: The Impact on American Innovation and Jobs, And Potential 
Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Internet, 113th 
Cong. 45 (2013) (statement of John Boswell, Senior Vice President and General 
Counsel of SAS Inst., Inc.). 
 161  Id. 
 162  H.R. 3349, 113th Cong. (2013).  The Innovation Protection Act aims to give the 
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Offensive Use of Patents (STOP) Act,163 and the Innovation Act.164  
Although many of these acts include ideas that the Executive Branch 
suggested, they also serve as evidence that Congress can effectively 
develop legislation that will help put an end to abusive patent litigation 
without the help of Presidential intervention. 
Recently, several state legislatures have begun considering or 
enacting bills that take affirmative steps to combat patent trolls at a 
more local level.165  The success of these laws is still undetermined, 
however, and only in May of 2013 did a state law first prosecute an 
abusive patent troll.166  Furthermore, some commentators raise 
concerns that state-based patent regulation may be preempted by 
federal patent law.167  Pending the success of these state-based patent 
troll laws, other states may also continue implementing similar pieces 
of legislation. 
 
 
USPTO more flexibility in its budget by creating a separate fund structure.  The Act 
allows the Director of the USPTO to use funds received from fees without the same 
limitations as funds received from taxpayers. 
 163  H.R. 2766, 113th Cong. (2013).  The Stopping Offensive Use of Patents Act aims 
to make improvements to the transitional program for covered business method 
patents. 
 164  H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013).  The Innovation Act aims to heighten pleading 
requirements in patent infringement cases, educate small businesses on how to protect 
themselves from abusive patent litigation, and place limitations on discovery.  
 165  Vermont was the first state to pass a law targeting patent trolls and abusive 
patent litigation.  The bill, which is known as the Bad Faith Assertions of Patent 
Infringement Act aims to end frivolous patent infringement lawsuits while not 
interfering with federal patent law and legitimate patent infringement actions.  See VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195–4199 (LEXIS through 2013 adjourned session).  Nebraska 
Attorney General Jon Bruning has “declared war” on patent trolls and has given public 
support to the Nebraska Patent Abuse Prevention Act, which is currently being 
considered in the Nebraska legislature.  See Timothy B. Lee, Nebraska’s Attorney General 
has Declared War on Patent Trolls, WASH. POST (Sept. 12, 2013, 8:50 AM), http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/09/12/nebraskas-attorney-general-
has-declared-war-on-patent-trolls/.  See also Leg. of Neb., 103rd Leg., 2nd Sess., REQ 
03798 (NE. 2013).  Maine has also considered a bill similar to Vermont’s Bad Faith 
Assertions of Patent Infringement Act to target patent trolls and end abusive patent 
litigation.  See Mal Leary, Maine Lawmakers Consider Limiting Patent Trolls, THE MAINE 
PUB. BROAD. NETWORK (Jan. 2, 2014), http://www.mpbn.net/home/tabid/36/ 
ctl/ViewItem/mid/5347/ItemId/31557/Default.aspx.  
 166  Complaint, Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Inv., LLC, No. 282-5-13Wncu (Super. Ct. 
Vt. 2013), available at http://www.atg.state.vt.us/assets/files/Vermont%20v%20MPH 
J%20Technologies%20Complaint.pdf. 
 167  See Thomas Carey, Patent Trolls in the Crosshairs: Vermont’s Aggressive Stance and the 
Emerging Federal Response, LEXISNEXIS (Aug. 1, 2013, 4:10 PM), http://www.lexis 
nexis.com/legalnewsroom/intellectual-property/b/patent-law-blog/archive/2013/0 
8/01/patent-trolls-in-the-crosshairs-vermont-39-s-aggressive-stance-and-the-emerging-
federal-response.aspx (discussing whether the Vermont law is “stillborn” because of 
federal preemption). 
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 The number of proposed bills addressing patent trolls 
demonstrates Congress’ interest in combating abusive patent 
litigation.  Novel techniques such as state-based legislation further 
show the impact of the patent troll problem as well as highlight the 
creativity that lawmakers have used in order to develop more effective 
ways of addressing the patent troll issue.  As time goes on and more 
legislators develop an increased appreciation of the patent troll 
problem, they are likely to write even more bills, perhaps with even 
more creative strategies aimed at reducing abusive patent litigation. 
B.  USPTO Review of Infringement Claims 
Another way in which abusive patent litigation can be stopped is 
through more careful monitoring of patent infringement lawsuits by 
the USPTO.  Senator Charles Schumer and former Senator Jon Kyl 
believe that requiring the USPTO to evaluate and certify patent 
infringement claims prior to the commencement of a lawsuit will 
effectively reduce abusive patent litigation.168  Reflecting this theory, 
Senator Schumer has proposed a bill known as the Patent Quality 
Improvement Act of 2013.169  Since this approach focuses on the 
litigious aspects of the patent system, but also requires USPTO action, 
it can be considered a “hybrid approach” to solving the patent troll 
problem.  Because of this distinction, this Comment considers it 
separately from other legislative actions discussed above. 
In addition to cutting down on frivolous patent infringement 
lawsuits, Senator Schumer’s bill would also give examiners at the 
USPTO an opportunity to take a second look at an issued patent when 
a lawsuit is initiated to determine whether the patent is truly valid.170  A 
second review may reveal details overlooked during the first review, 
and these details may effectively invalidate a patent, thereby preventing 
unnecessary patent litigation.  Furthermore, this strategy does not 
create an additional bar to obtaining a patent; therefore, it still rewards 
small, inventive entities for actual ingenuity and technological 
contributions. 
 
 
 
 
 168  See Ingrid Lunden, Senator Charles Schumer Targets Patent Trolls, Wants USPTO to 
Review Infringement Suits Before They Head to Court, TECH CRUNCH (May 1, 2013), 
http://www.techcrunch.com/2013/05/01/senator-charles-schumer-plans-bill-for-
uspto-to-review-patent-troll-suits-before-they-head-to-court/. 
 169  S. 866, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 170  Id. 
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Thus far, Senator Schumer’s bill has received positive feedback 
from patent industry analysts.171  Some view this approach to be a 
similar, but better, alternative to fee shifting, because fee shifting may 
scare parties into settling lawsuits rather than entertaining the idea of 
engaging in an expensive legal battle.172  With this proposed strategy, 
however, an innocent defendant in an abusive litigation proceeding 
would not be forced to settle right away because the lawsuit may be 
deemed invalid at the onset of litigation.  Therefore, this approach 
would be more effective in actually preventing abusive litigation and 
frivolous lawsuits because it would make it impossible for a suit to 
commence without the USPTO’s stamp of approval. 
There are several possible downsides to this proposal, however.  
First, by requiring USPTO involvement, the organization is further 
burdened173 because it must train staff on the mechanics of this 
approval process—a process which may also be subject to a large 
volume of requests.  Furthermore, by requiring USPTO approval, 
smaller inventive entities may experience increased difficulty when 
trying to assert their patent rights via an infringement lawsuit.  In order 
to account for this possible consequence, this bill should make use of 
the fee structure and “micro-entity” status put in place by the AIA.174  
This structure would prevent small patent holders from incurring 
additional financial burdens when filing an infringement claim. 
If properly implemented,175 taking into account the circumstances 
surrounding not only large corporations with expansive patent 
portfolios, but also the individual and other small inventors, this 
proposal would likely reduce the thousands176 of lawsuits brought by 
patent trolls each year.  There are risks, however, associated with this 
bill, and like all legislation, it should be carefully considered prior to 
congressional approval. 
 
 171  See, e.g., Joe Mullin, Finally, a Bill to End Patent Trolling, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 23, 
2013, 5:34 PM), http://www.arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/10/its-finally-here-a-
bill-to-end-patent-trolling/. 
 172  S. 866, 113th Cong. (2013). 
 173  See Thomas & Breitzman, supra note 5. 
 174  35 U.S.C. § 123 (2012). 
 175  Some analysts suggest that combining this act with the SHIELD Act would cut 
down on the most egregious patent troll lawsuits.  See, e.g., Mike Masnick, Chuck Schumer 
to Introduce Patent Reform Bill to Make it Cheaper to Fight Back Against Patent Trolls, TECH 
DIRT (May 1, 2013, 7:52 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/blog/innovation/articles/ 
20130430/22152622896/chuck-schumer-to-introduce-patent-reform-bill-to-make-it-
cheaper-to-fight-back-against-trolls.shtml/. 
 176  See Chien, supra note 111. 
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C.  “Vigilante” Patent Justice 
Another interesting technique to reduce abusive litigation that 
simultaneously stops infringers and gives patent trolls a warning allows 
patentees—particularly large corporations with expansive patent 
portfolios—to self-police against infringers.  Rather than suing a patent 
infringer and commencing a lengthy and expensive litigation process, 
a company can take steps to stop the infringer without pursuing legal 
action.  For instance, Apple recently made use of a “buy-back” program 
to repurchase infringing products from customers who have already 
purchased the items.177  Apple’s program focuses on recovering 
counterfeit power adapters for the iPhone, iPad, and iPod.  Apple 
claims that these counterfeit products may pose legitimate safety 
concerns—a claim supported by allegations that a Chinese flight 
attendant was fatally electrocuted by a counterfeit device.178  In 
exchange for the infringing product, the company chooses to give the 
consumer either the real product or a credit which could be used 
towards the purchase of the real product. 
Although the idea of companies pursuing “vigilante justice” in 
order to maintain their patent rights may be unsettling to some, this 
type of strategy has three key benefits.  First, it helps remove “knock-
off” products from the market which, in some industries, may raise 
significant safety concerns.  Second, programs such as these can 
provide a company with a significant public relations boost.179  Finally, 
this strategy provides a non-litigious option to companies who wish to 
fight back against infringers but wish to differentiate themselves from 
the patent trolls who are known for often utilizing abusive litigation 
techniques.  By pursuing a non-litigious remedy, large companies with 
legitimate infringement claims avoid burdening the courts.  
Additionally, these types of programs do nothing to harm the 
intellectual property rights of legitimate small inventors, but they do 
send a significant message to unlawful infringers that their 
 
 177  Apple has been accepting returns of USB adapters produced by third parties 
since August 16, 2013.  In exchange for a counterfeit or third party adapter, Apple 
allows a user to purchase an Apple USB power adapter at a reduced price.  To access 
further information regarding the details of Apple’s program, see USB Power Adapter 
Takeback Program, APPLE, http://www.apple.com/support/usbadapter-takeback/ (last 
visited Nov. 4, 2013). 
 178  See Paul Mozur, Apple Investigates China iPhone Death Allegations, THE WALL ST. J. 
(July 15, 2013, 5:59 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2013/07/15/apple-
investigates-china-iphone-death-allegations/. 
 179  See Adam Pasick, Apple’s iPhone Charger Take-back Program is Genius PR—and it 
May Even Boost the Bottom Line, QUARTZ (Aug. 7, 2013), http://qz.com/ 112722/apples-
iphone-charger-take-back-program-is-genius-pr-and-it-may-even-boost-the-bottom-
line/. 
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infringement will not be tolerated. 
D.  Working Requirements and Compulsory Licenses 
All of the proposals discussed supra do not provide an immediate 
or complete solution to the problems surrounding patent trolls.  
Individually, they may improve the patent system by restructuring 
several small areas, but the patent system’s current organization still 
allows for patent trolls to operate.  This problem may be more 
efficiently alleviated, however, through the institution of a working 
requirement and compulsory license system that guarantees continued 
protection only to patentees who actually use or produce products or 
services covered by their patents.  Under a working requirement, 
Congress could mandate that a compulsory license be granted to 
anyone who wishes to use a patent that is not currently practiced, used, 
or produced by the patent’s inventor or assignee.  Thus, those who 
wish to use a patented technology not currently practiced by its 
inventor would have the right to do so while the patent holder receives 
financial compensation for the use of his invention. 
The idea of a working requirement is not new or novel.  Many 
countries outside the United States already use working requirements 
and compulsory licenses within their local patent systems.180  In fact, 
working requirements are included in the Patent Cooperation Treaty181 
(PCT), an international agreement to which the United States is a 
party.  Specifically, the PCT mandates that no compulsory license be 
denied to anyone wishing to use a patent that has not been used or 
produced by the patentee within the past four years or within four 
years of its filing date.182  Any compulsory license granted under this 
provision is non-exclusive and non-transferrable, unless the transfer 
occurs as part of the sale of an entire business enterprise.183  The idea 
of a working requirement is not universally accepted, however, as other 
pieces of international legislation, such as the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights184 (TRIPs Agreement), 
provide that working requirements should not be instituted except in 
 
 180  See Compulsory License Provisions across Europe, ASS’N OF PATENT LAW FIRMS, 
http://www.avidity-ip.com/assets/pdf/pageview_20070802161505.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 25, 2014). 
 181  Patent Cooperation Treaty art. 5, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 
231 (reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 978 (1970)). 
 182  Id. 
 183  Id. 
 184  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197. 
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exceptional circumstances.185  Despite this provision of the TRIPs 
Agreement, however, many European countries continue to make use 
of working requirements and compulsory licenses. 
Currently, the only embodiment of a working requirement within 
the American patent system is the maintenance fee that a patentee 
must pay to the USPTO every five years.186  If the fee is not paid, the 
patent will lapse, and protection will be lost.187  The purpose of the 
maintenance fee is to encourage a patent holder to make economical 
use of his patent.  By eliminating the maintenance fee and 
simultaneously instituting a working requirement via a compulsory 
license system, patent holders would still be encouraged to practice 
their patents, and the patent trolls who do not actually make or use 
patented technologies would be stripped of much of their power.  
Instead of being able to threaten alleged infringers with costly lawsuits, 
patent trolls would now be forced to comply with the terms of a 
compulsory license agreement.  Furthermore, this provision would not 
increase the difficulty of obtaining a patent or make a patent worthless 
if it is not practiced; non-practicing patentees would still be 
compensated through a set fee schedule for compulsory licenses. 
A compulsory license system may actually benefit many small 
entities and individual inventors as well.  Currently, if a small inventor’s 
patent is being infringed, he may be hesitant or unable to bring a 
lawsuit against the infringer because of the associated costs.  Under a 
compulsory license system, however, a patentee would no longer have 
to file a lawsuit in order to receive compensation for the use of his or 
her invention, but instead, could likely exercise his rights through an 
administrative action.  This aspect could be implemented in a fashion 
similar to the European model of compulsory licenses, whereby third-
parties simply apply to their national patent authority to obtain a 
license.188  Furthermore, the reduction in the number of patent 
infringement lawsuits brought on behalf of both patent trolls and 
more legitimate entities would help alleviate the stress currently facing 
the court system and increase overall judicial efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
 185  Michael LaFlame, Jr., The European Patent System: An Overview and Critique, 32 
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 605, 610 (2010). 
 186  See 37 C.F.R. § 1.27(a) (2013). 
 187  Id. 
 188  Andrew C. Mace, TRIPs, eBay, and Denials of Injunctive Relief: Is Article 31 
Compliance Everything?, 10 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 232, 247 (2009). 
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Although it is likely that patent trolls would be negatively affected 
by the institution of a working requirement and compulsory license 
system, other legitimate entities may also oppose the implementation 
of the associated stipulations.  For example, many colleges, 
universities, and other research institutions often develop new 
patentable technologies but do not utilize the inventions themselves.  
Instead, they license their patents and use the proceeds to continue 
other educational and research efforts.  When their patents are 
infringed, however, these institutions often file lawsuits that are very 
similar in nature to those brought by patent trolls, and because of this, 
some colleges and universities have even argued against patent reform 
aimed at patent trolls, claiming that research institutions could suffer 
negative consequences as well.189  These organizations are not patent 
trolls, however.  Instead, they often serve as leaders in new technology 
development, and it is important that their activities are not 
discouraged or constructively stopped by the implementation of a 
working requirement.190  Therefore, if a working requirement were to 
be added to the United States patent system, lawmakers should 
consider including an exemption for these organizations similar to the 
exemptions provided in the several other pieces of pending legislation 
discussed supra. 
Despite its potential effectiveness, a working requirement is not 
something that Congress has thoroughly explored.  Due to the benefits 
discussed supra, however, the development of a working requirement 
and compulsory license system is an idea that warrants significant 
consideration.  Unlike many of the President’s currently proposed 
actions and some of Congress’ pending legislation, a working 
requirement targets the heart of the patent troll problem.  Instead of 
attacking ancillary aspects of how patent trolls abuse the patent system, 
working requirements eliminate significant amounts of abusive patent 
litigation brought by non-practicing patentees and patent trolls.  
Therefore, Congress—not the Executive Branch—should take the 
time and effort to explore the benefits, and possible consequences, of 
implementing a working requirement and compulsory license schema 
 
 189  Timothy B. Lee, Patent Trolls Have a Surprising Ally: Universities, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 30, 2013, 11:05 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/ 
2013/11/30/patent-trolls-have-a-surprising-ally-universities/. 
 190  The USPTO reports that academic institutions account for approximately 4.3 
percent of issued patents, and this number has risen consistently from when it was 0.2 
percent in 1985.  See UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. COLLEGES AND 
UNIVERSITIES—UTILITY PATENT GRANTS, CALENDAR YEARS 1969-2012, available at http:// 
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/univ/univ_toc.htm (last updated Mar. 
26, 2014). 
TAGLIENTE_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/19/2015  5:46 PM 
344 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:311 
within the United States patent system. 
E.  Other Alternative Methods 
There are myriad other ways in which the patent system could be 
modified to deal with the patent troll problem.  Several other 
suggestions from within the intellectual property community include 
encouraging lawyers to develop expertise in patent defense 
strategies,191 encouraging patent defense attorneys to operate on a 
contingent fee basis,192 joining defendants in order to team up against 
patent trolls,193 and encouraging victims of abusive patent litigation to 
fight, rather than settle, to reduce the overall success rate of patent 
trolls.194 
Others suggest fixing the patent system by making it more difficult 
to obtain a patent by placing restrictions on how continuation 
applications are filed.195  Unfortunately, plans such as these do not take 
into account the current number of valid patents or the devious nature 
of patent trolls.  Additionally, as discussed supra, placing further 
obstacles in the way of obtaining patent protection may have numerous 
negative consequences, such as denying patent protection to 
legitimate inventions. 
Almost all possible patent troll elimination strategies have various 
pros and cons that should be carefully evaluated prior to 
implementation.  And, as discussed supra, the Executive Branch should 
not mandate this implementation.  Instead, attempts to reduce the 
negative impact of patent trolls should come from the body properly 
situated to make changes to the patent system: Congress. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Patent trolls pose a significant threat to the integrity and 
efficiency of both the patent and court systems.  They bring frivolous 
lawsuits, not because they care about their inventions, but because they 
want to make money.  They undermine parties who are faced with 
legitimate patent infringement issues.  They create unnecessary 
 
 191  See Chien, supra note 10. 
 192  See Chien, supra note 10.  
 193  See Chien, supra note 10.  
 194  Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry, How to Get Rid of Patent Trolls for Good, BUS. INSIDER 
(Aug. 17, 2011 3:16 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-to-get-rid-of-patent-
trolls- for-good-2011-8/. 
 195  See James Bessen, The Power of No, SLATE (Dec. 4, 2013, 9:45 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2013/12/the_simple_fix_t
hat_could_heal_the_patent_system.single.html. 
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burdens for courts tasked with hearing patent infringement cases.  
They also threaten an American economy that has a significant stake 
in patent-intensive industries and intellectual property in general.196  
These problems cannot go unaddressed. 
Despite the problems that patent trolls introduce, and the good 
intentions that the White House displayed by entering into the hunt 
for patent trolls, the Executive is not the appropriate branch of the 
federal government to address these issues.  Patent trolls and the 
myriad of potential problems they cause should be assessed and dealt 
with by Congress, which not only has explicitly enumerated 
jurisdiction over patent-related issues,197 but also is in a better position 
to regulate and continually modernize the American patent system. 
The patent system, as with all legal entities, must continue to 
evolve in order to address the challenges of a constantly changing 
economy and society.198  This evolutionary process should request and 
respect the input of all stakeholders, including Congress, the USPTO, 
patent agents, patent attorneys, patent examiners, and inventors—
large and small, public and private.  These stakeholders also have a 
duty to seriously consider how the effects of the patent system’s 
evolution will impact those who routinely use and rely on the system, 
in addition to its impact on the American economy and the American 
inventor’s way of life. 
For now, it is unlikely that the patent troll problem will be stopped 
by a wizard’s magical spell or a witch’s special potion.  Instead, the 
patent troll problem will need to be continually addressed by a much 
less supernatural body: Congress.  Although there are many possible 
strategies available that could be used in the war on patent trolls, 
Congress has not yet taken the time to consider them all.  As time goes 
on, however, the same creativity that inspires inventors to develop new 
and exciting technologies may also be the “magical” inspiration used 
by lawmakers to come up with new ways of effectively managing the 
United States patent system and defeating the most notorious patent 
trolls. 
 
 
 196  ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION & UNITED STATES PATENT AND 
TRADEMARK OFFICE , INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: INDUSTRIES IN 
FOCUS 39-53 (2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/publications/ 
IP_Report_March_2012.pdf (explaining the estimated financial impacts of intellectual 
property on the US economy).  
 197  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 198  See Chien, supra note 10. 
